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Eliciting Motives for Trust and Reciprocity by Attitudinal 
and Behavioural Measures 
 
Value Surveys may reveal well-behaved societies by the statistical treatment of the agents’ 
declarations of compliance with social values. Similarly, the results of experiments conducted 
on games with conflict of interest trace back to two important primitives of social capital – 
trust and reciprocity – which can be used to explain deviations from the Nash equilibrium and 
which lead to the optimal cooperative outcome. In this paper we attempt to elicit the true 
motive(s) underlying the behaviour of players in experimental trust and dictator games and 
suggest that the most informative utilization of surveys in this regard goes beyond the simple 
comparison of answers to a questionnaire with actual behaviour. Specifically the paper uses 
descriptive statistics and ordered probit models to analyse whether, and to what extent, 
answers to a questionnaire about attitudes to trusting and reciprocating predict subjects’ 
behaviour and, by comparing behaviour in Trust and Dictator Game, disentangles the 
strategic and altruistic motivations. We find no simple or direct correlation between 
behavioural trust or trustworthiness and attitudinal trust or disposition to reciprocate. 
However, dividing subjects according to attitudinal trust and trustworthiness, we observe that 
the link between the questionnaire and experimental sessions is more subtle than the mere 
correlation between average attitudes and average behaviours. The information conveyed by 
a survey appears to be much more powerful ex post – once the two motivational components 
have been separated out. 
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   1 
“Suit the action to the word, the word to the action,” 
(Shakespeare, 1601, Hamlet Act 3, Scene 2). 
 
1.Introduction 
Value  Surveys  may  reveal  well-behaved  societies  by  the  statistical  treatment  of  the  agents’ 
declarations of compliance with social values. Similarly, the results of experiments conducted on 
games with conflict of interest trace back to two important primitives of social capital - trust and 
reciprocity – which can be used to explain deviations from the Nash equilibrium and which lead to 
the  optimal  cooperative  outcome.  The  main  difference  between  experiments  performed  in 
Behavioural Economics vis-à-vis survey based information arises from the fact that the latter consist 
of each agent’s self-evaluation of his trusting attitude as a person and of being trustworthy as a 
participant in his social environment, while the former directly identify the two (or more) players’ 
behaviour  in  a  social  interaction.  When  comparing  results  stemming  from  these  two  empirical 
research methods, this asymmetry, arising from the lack of a strategic setting in the former and its 
presence in the latter, has to be carefully tackled. Indeed, “social capital (...) is embodied in the 
relations among persons” (Coleman, 1990, p.304; italics in the text). 
In  strategic  settings,  significant  questions  await  an  answer.  To  what  extent  does  individual 
behaviour, shaped by trust and reciprocity, depart from strict self-interest? Do trust and reciprocity 
orient the relations among persons towards the strategic reasoning which is needed to mutually 
improve on the respective pay-offs, or do they trump any strategic reasoning and draw out from the 
individual his other-regarding (social) preferences? (Farina and Sbriglia, 2008).  
In experiments conducted on the Trust Game the behaviour of players often deviates from the Nash 
solution  of  the  first mover  sending  nothing.  The  sender  neglects  the  sub-game  perfect  strategy 
profile and sends a positive amount, and the respondent renounces his dominant strategy and sends 
back a positive amount. In the literature this violation of orthodox rational choice has mostly been 
explained  by  evidence  testifying  to  the  presence  of  other-regarding  (social)  preferences.  The 
suggested  rationale  is  that  the  social  relations  in  which  the  two  players  are  involved  embed  a 
disposition to trust by the sender and the expectation of trustworthy behaviour by the respondent. 
When each player’s behaviour conforms to altruism the maximization of the utility function of the 
two players depends on the sum of their respective payoffs (Rabin, 1993); when behaviour reflects 
inequality aversion it involves the minimization of the distance between their respective payoffs 
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). Still, we are convinced that this is by no 
means  the  full  story.  To  sustain  our  doubts,  the  typical  example  is  the  sequential  Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (PD), where it is difficult to tell whether cooperative behaviour is the effect of reciprocity   2 
or of altruism. Therefore, the motivation for trusting and/or reciprocating behaviour delivering the 
cooperative solution in one-shot games with conflict of interest deserves a more comprehensive 
investigation.  
In the literature, following the seminal paper in which Glaeser et al. (2000) analysed measures of  
self-reported trust and trustworthiness (answers to questionnaires such as the World Value Survey 
(WVS) and the European Social Values (ESV)), the question has been posed as to what extent there 
could be a connection between attitudes to trust and trustworthiness and actual behaviour observed 
in laboratory experiments.
1 The correlation between a disposition towards trust and reciprocation 
declared in the questionnaire of the World Value Survey (WVS) or the European Value Survey 
(EVS) and the findings of experiments testing the actual behaviour in Trust Games is currently the 
subject  of  debate.  Attitudinal  survey  questions  as  reported  in  the  EVS  are  often  regarded  as 
inefficient indicators of trust, since they lack the behavioural underpinnings (Putnam, 1995) that  
one might desire when measuring trust. The empirical analyses which have been undertaken to date 
are still a long way from  producing a set of consistent results. Glaeser et al. (2000), the first 
analysis to compare attitudinal and behavioural evidence stemming from experiments, report that 
attitudinal survey questions do not predict trusting behaviour by senders in experiments; on the 
contrary, in their study answers to the WVS questionnaire appear to be correlated to respondents’ 
behaviour, thus suggesting that the attitudinal measure is related not to trust but to trustworthiness. 
Lazzarini  et  al.  (2005)  presents  similar  experimental  evidence.  Sapienza  et  al.  (2007)  find  a 
correlation  between  the  senders’  actual  behaviour  in  the  experiment  and  their  expected 
trustworthiness, that is each sender’s declared beliefs about the amount the respondent is willing to 
return. On the other hand, no correlation between senders’ actual behaviour and attitudinal trust or 
expected  trustworthiness  was  found    by  Fehr  et  al.  (2003),  who  suggest  that  to  some  extent 
attitudinal  trust  predicts  behavioural  trust.  A  natural  candidate  for  the  explanation  of  diverging 
results is the variety of the experimental settings. For instance, Sapienza et al. (2007) notice the 
peculiarity of the Fehr et al. (2003) experimental evidence, where heterogeneity across German 
households as players in the TG impedes the trustor from identifying himself with the trustee, thus 
causing a deviation of the experimental evidence from the WVS’s attitudinal evidence.  
However, many papers (most notably Charness and Rabin, 2005 and Cox, 2004) have lamented the 
lack of a clear distinction between behavioural trust and reciprocity manifested by, respectively, the 
first and second movers in Trust Game experiments. Indeed, the players’ intentions are revealed by 
                                                 
1 It was contended  that the degree of trustworthiness of the social context in which individuals operate may interfere 
with  individuals’  trust.  The  most  frequent  criticisms  are:  (i)  the  tendency  to  set  up  an  hypothetical  situation  in 
responding to a questionnaire could lead the subject to underlook possible threats just because he does not find himself 
in a real setting; (ii) the tendency to self-idealisation, so that the subject may overestimate his standing in terms of moral 
values; (iii) the lack of a gain may induce the subject to give loose answers (see, for instance, Ciriolo, 2007).    3 
the matrix of the monetary payoffs and their distribution, as happens in the accounts of trust and 
reciprocity in which only the distributive outcome matters (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999). However, two different designs of the Trust Game in extensive form may elicit two 
different motives. If an outside option is inserted in the extensive form, a first mover who discards 
the Nash play and sends a certain amount to the second player makes a “voluntary” choice of 
“investing”  in  the  relationship,  while  the  first  player’s  choice  in  the  traditional  design  can  be 
labelled “involuntary” (McCabe, et al., 2003). Similarly to the first mover of the Rosenthal’s (1981) 
Centipede, the trustor reveals the intention to bear a risk (of getting a payoff which is lower than the 
outside option) and the trustee may then be moved by a sentiment of reciprocation (and also of 
gratefulness,  as  his  self-esteem  is  strengthened  by  the  other  player’s  recognition  of  his 
trustworthiness).  
The “outside option” example shows that the intention to “invest” in the Trust Game in extensive 
form revealed by a move could conceal different motivations. Whether the motive underlying the 
behaviour manifested by the first mover is the desire to invest in a relationship of mutual advantage 
with the trustee or the desire to be good to him independently from his own final payoff, remains an 
unsettled  question.  We think  that  research  efforts  should  concentrate  on  identifying  the  motive 
which is actually at work, out of the two possible motives embedded in the trust game: 1)  an 
“investment” motive - conditional cooperation is a way to express the expectation of reciprocal 
behaviour; and/or, 2) an altruistic motive - what may appear as an “investment” actually conceals a 
social preference, that is the intention to gratuitously favour the other player.  
In this paper we attempt to elicit the true motive(s) underlying the behaviour of each of the two 
players and suggest that the most informative utilization of surveys in this regard goes beyond the 
simple comparison of answers to a questionnaire with actual behaviour. The statistical analysis of 
the relation between players’ behaviour in the sessions and their declared attitudes to trust, allows a 
deeper understanding of the players’ behaviour and a better evaluation of the experimental results. 
The objective of disentangling the strategic motive (the intention of the trustor to elicit benevolence 
from the trustee, and the trustee interest in reciprocating) from the altruistic motive is pursued by 
evaluating the correlation between attitudinal and behavioural measures of trust and trustworthiness. 
We  thus  employ  the  “words”  of  answers  to  a  questionnaire  in  order  to  better  understand  the 
motivations underlying “actions”. 
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2. The standard Trust Game experimental design 
 
The  first  question  we  address  here  is  the  replication,  in  an  Italian  environment,  of  a  similar 
experimental design to that implemented by Glaeser et al. (2000) for the United States and Lazzarini 
et al. (2005) for Brazil, in order to test the relationship between two players’ behaviour and their 
questionnaire answers. These sessions were conducted in Siena and Salerno, in May and July 2007. 
Overall, 168 students participated in the sessions of this first part of the experiment.  
All sessions were divided into two different stages. In the first stage, the subjects were asked to fill 
in  a  questionnaire  in  which  some  of  the  EVS  questions  were  reproduced.  In  addition  to  basic 
information on the characteristics of subjects, we asked all subjects - those who played as senders 
and those who played as respondents – to answer both the standard questions from the World 
Values Survey eliciting the general level of trust of the subject (“Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted, or that you can never be too careful when dealing with others?” 
(v47), and “Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you…” (v23)),  as well as 
some more specific questions (is it ever justified, ….. to not pay taxes, to tell lies, to not pay for 
your ticket on the bus), eliciting the opinion of the subject about compliance with civic values. The 
Appendix reports the complete set of trust/trustworthiness questions that appeared on the students’ 
computer screens.   
The rationale of our selection of WVS questions is to make the questionnaire gather information 
on  what  may  be  called  the  subject’s  degree  of  trust  (the  disposition  to  be  trusting)  and 
trustworthiness (the disposition to be trustworthy and then inclined to reciprocate). Recalling the 
“multiple self” put forward by Elster (1986),  these two attitudes can be traced back to the two selves 
of a subject: (i) his personal self expresses his degree of trust and consists of his personal opinion 
about the degree to which people in their environment and/or political institutions could be trusted;  
(ii) his social self expresses his degree of trustworthiness and consists of the civic values he tends to 
comply (or not comply) with as an individual in a social environment. Indeed, just as the subject’s 
self-reported degree of trust should be reflected by his actual behaviour, his evaluation of the degree 
of trustworthiness that a particular social situation merited can be taken as a proxy for the degree to 
which he could be considered trustworthy and thus as a proxy of his disposition to reciprocate.  To 
what extent the personal and the social selves are connected within each subject, so that subjects 
sitting in experimental sessions show a behaviour which is coherent with their declared attitudes is 
one of the questions investigated here. 
As for the second stage, as in previous analyses of behavioural trust, we adopted the experimental 
setting of the Trust (Investment) Game (Berg et al. 1995). This game involves a bargaining context   5 
in which two players (Senders and Respondents) decide how to share a well defined amount of 
money
2.  At the first step, Senders make an investment decision transferring a certain number of 
experimental tokens to Respondents. The number of tokens is then tripled by the experimenter, so 
that  Respondents  receive  three  times  the  amount  of  tokens  initially  sent.  At  the  second  step, 
Respondents decide how many tokens to return to Senders. The standard design was adopted, in as 
much as subjects were randomly divided into two groups (Respondents and Senders) once they had 
completed the questionnaire, and then the game was played according to the rules described above. 
There are two main differences between our  work and those of Glaeser et al, 2000 and Lazzarini et 
al, 2005. First, we set the multiplying factor – α – equal to 3, as in the original design by Berg et al. 
(1995), rather than 2, as in the two above mentioned papers. The reason is that the higher value of  α 
coefficient places a high weight on trustworthiness, which can then be better monitored. Second, in 
contrast  to  Lazzarini  et  al.  (2005),  where  subjects  were  playing  in  face-to-face  interactions,  we 
adopted a double-blind anonymous partnership protocol: Senders and Respondents were selected 
randomly and anonymously by the computer and no personal communication was allowed during 
the sessions.
3 The purpose here was to prevent any existing social ties or prior information sharing 
by  subjects  from  affecting  the  results.  We  thus  attempted  to  minimise  disturbances  due  to  the 
interplay between attitudes resulting from  particular cultural values and behaviour induced by the 
specific  experimental  setting  in  order  to  preserve  comparison  with  Trust  Game  experiments 
conducted in very different cultural and social environments such as the United States and Brazil. 
All these features of the experimental design were used in both Model 1 and Model 2. An additional 
feature  was  introduced  in  Model  2,  whereby  not  only  the  first  but  also  the  second  mover  was 
endowed with 10 tokens.  
 
3. Model 1. A comparison between attitudinal and behavioural measures 
 
Table 1 presents the results of estimating Model 1: Ordered Probit regressions connecting behaviour 
in the Trust Game to answers to questions concerning each agent’s self-evaluation of his trusting 
attitude  as  a  person  and  of  being  trustworthy  as  a  participant  in  his  social  environment.  More 
specifically, we test: (i) the correlation between the Sender’s trust EVS questions (his own personal 
characteristics and opinion in evaluating institutions) and his behavioural trust measure (the amount 
                                                 
2 The Sender initial endowment was equal to 10 experimental tokens. The experimental exchange rate was set to 0.1 
Euro cent for each token. Payoffs varied between 6 and 10 Euro per subjects. Details of the payoff structure were 
illustrated in the Instruction sheet.  
3 In Glaeser et al., 2000, friends were allowed to participate in the same trust game. The effect of friendship or, more 
generally, of  a previous social relationship on trusting behaviour was however unclear.    6 
sent);  (ii)  the  correlation  between  the  Respondent’s  EVS  trustworthiness  questions  and  his 
behavioural trustworthiness (the amount sent back).  
 
 
Table 1: Model 1 Ordered Probit model of amounts sent and sent back 
Coef. .      z Coef. .      z Coef. .      z Coef. .      z
Tokens sent - - - - 0.62 8.09 0.56 9.07
salerno 0.32 1.03 0.35 1.29 0.08 0.23 0.13 0.49
Female -0.14 -0.49 -0.64 -2.79 0.19 0.62 0.23 0.96
age 2.35 1.70 1.89 1.52 -1.89 -1.19 -0.17 -0.14
Mid to high income family -0.11 -0.31 -0.08 -0.30 0.32 0.82 0.22 0.73
Economics student -0.04 -0.15 -0.06 -0.26 -0.36 -1.14 -0.49 -2.02
Mother has secondary or tertiary education 0.21 0.81 0.20 0.91 0.36 1.24 0.39 1.62
Index of trust (v47) 0.37 1.65 0.48 2.64 -0.71 -2.24 -0.31 -1.36
Trust the family 0.38 1.06 - - 0.45 0.97 - -
Trust people you know  0.31 0.69 - - -0.63 -1.50 - -
Trust new aquaintances 0.24 0.61 - - 0.36 0.87 - -
Trust immigrants 0.02 0.07 - - 0.45 1.16 - -
Trust the government -0.10 -0.28 - - -0.21 -0.55 - -
Trust Parliament -0.27 -0.74 - - -0.50 -1.36 - -
Trust Political Parties 0.98 1.88 - - 0.58 1.23 - -
Trust Public Officials -0.23 -0.71 - - 0.21 0.54 - -
It is Justified to: (1=never; 10 = always)
Try to obtain State benefits ilicitly -0.23 -1.27 - - -0.30 -1.43 - -
Evade taxes 0.15 0.62 - - 0.37 1.79 - -
Drive someone else's car without their permission0.47 2.40 - - -0.09 -0.44 - -
Tell lies in one's own interests 0.39 2.05 - - 0.39 1.93 - -
for someone to have an extra marital affair -0.03 -0.21 - - 0.15 0.80 - -
Accept illegal payments (bribes) 0.09 0.40 - - 0.04 0.20 - -
Use moonlighters - to avoid taxes -0.22 -0.88 - - -0.06 -0.27 - -





Full model Only V47
0.29 0.25
Senders: Tokens sent





note: coefficients which are significant at .05<p<.10 are indicated in italics, coefficients which are significant at p<.05 
are indicated in bold. 
 
 
Answers to the “Trust question” (v47) has a positive and statistically significant impact on the 
amount sent by Senders. As for Respondents, the negative sign on the coefficient is statistically 
significant at 5% in the full specification however the economic meaning, is, to say the least, a little 
strange, as it would imply that the more he trusts, the less he sends back.  
As for the other questions, the Senders manifest a sort of “manipulative behaviour”, as the higher 
their score on questions such as it being justified to lie in one’s own interests or to take a friend’s 
car without permission, etc., show a moral acceptance of cheating, the more they send. On the other 
hand,  the  more  Respondents  demonstrate  a  moral  acceptance  of  lack  of  civic  values  and,  in 
particular, literally free-riding behaviour (i.e. to travel on the bus without ticket), the less money 
they send back. The implication is that both Senders and Respondents are eager to take advantage   7 
of an opponent’s positive attitude in order to make business, even in spite of their tendency to 
downplay anti-civic behaviour as reported by the declared opinions “about the others”. On the one 
hand, the first disregards any moral evaluation of the second mover since the lower is the latter’s 
moral intransigence the more he invests. A plausible reason is the expectation that the disposition to 
cooperate in a strategic interaction is not reduced, but possibly magnified, by proneness to collusive 
behaviour as shown by the subjects’ answers as second movers. On the other hand, the second 
player appears to be encouraged to put in place a “saving behaviour” (he may think: “the less you 
send me, the less you deserve me to be sent you back”), which we can consider a social disposition 
towards the punishment of free-riders but at a personal benefit. 
We decided to initiate our research work by  replicating the Glaeser’s experiment assessing the 
extent to which attitudinal measures predict behavioural measures of trust and trustworthiness. In 
contrast to Glaeser et al. (2000) we find no correlation between attitudinal trust and behavioural 
trustworthiness and in contrast to Sapienza et al. (2007) we find no correlation between attitudinal 
trust and expected trustworthiness. Similarly to Fehr et al.(2003), attitudinal trust appears to be 
moderately correlated with behavioural trust. We may say that our replication in Model 1 of the 
standard Trust Game experimental design, in order to test the relationship between the two players’ 
behaviour and the questionnaire answers by Ordered Probit, has produced opaque results. All in all, 
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4. Model 2. Searching for the real motive underlying behavioural trust and reciprocity  
 
One possible reason for the “unsatisfactory” results in terms of the lack of relation between between 
attitudinal and behavioural measures of trust and trustworthiness lies in the ambiguity embedded in 
the experimental setting. In replicating for the Italian environment a similar experimental design to 
that implemented by Glaeser et al. (2000) for the United States and Lazzarini et al. (2005) for Brazil 
we have not yet addressed the issue we raised presented in the introduction: the need to disentangle 
the real motivations from the two possible ones – the “strategic investment” or the “altruistic” 
motives - of players’ behaviour in Trust Game experiments.  
An experimental design in which positive reciprocal behaviour responding to a generous action is 
neatly separated out from other-regarding (social) preferences has been constructed by Cox (2004). 
Cox modified the well-known investment game by Berg, Dickhault and McCabe (1995) in order to 
obtain information on whether it is the “trust/reciprocity” motive or the “social preferences” motive 
which underlies players’ behaviour. We drew on the ‘Cox’ experimental design to conduct a second 
set of experimental sessions in December 2007, the subjects being undergraduate students at the 
University of Siena. The students were randomly divided in two groups (Senders and Respondents, 
respectively), and each of them was denoted by the number of the computer and the number of the 
session in which he seated. As before, and in contrast to Glaeser et al. (2000) and Lazzarini et al. 
(2005), the double-blind procedure, that is anonymity with respect to both the other player and the 
experimenter, was insured.
4  
The so-called  “triadic” design by Cox comprises three treatments: 1) a Trust (Investment) Game 
(TG), in which both the senders and the Respondents were endowed with ten tokens (the rate of 
change was 1 token = €1); the trustees had to decide whether to send back some, all, or part of his 
endowment; 2) a Dictator Game (DG1), in which the trustor has to decide whether to send or not to 
send (all, or part of) his endowment to the other player - in the Instructions, both players were 
informed that the sender would by no means have had the opportunity to interact with the other 
player, as this latter player had to remain passive; and,  3) a modified Dictator Game (DG2), in 
which a second mover acting as Respondent had to send back or not to send back (all, or part of) the 
amount  that  he  has  received  by  a  first-mover  acting  as  sender
5,  which  the  experimenter  had 
multiplied by three. In the Instructions for DG2, the Respondent is made aware that the amount 
received was sent not by his opponent in the game he was playing, but by another unknown player 
                                                 
4 In the IMBE Conference held Alicante in March 2008, where a shorter version of this paper was presented, another 
paper dealing with attitudinal and behavioural measures of trust and trustworthiness was delivered (see in the references 
Capra et al., 2008). However, no comparison can be made, as the design of this paper does not use the double-blind 
precedure and  the same subjects participate in all games. 
5 Which could of course also be zero.   9 
whom he would not have had the opportunity to interact with.
6 The 194 students involved in our 
experiment, slightly more than those involved in the original Cox experiment, formed 33 pairs in 
the first two treatments and 31 pairs in the last one. In order to preserve independence in behaviour, 
each subject participated in only one session.  
The subjects were also asked to fill out the same questionnaire used in Model 1. Coherently with the 
arguments presented in section 2, we do not follow Cox (2004) in differentiating questions between 
the two groups of players. In fact, we do not think it appropriate to distinguish between the opinion 
of  the  subject  when  he  is  playing  as  a  Sender  and  when  he  is  playing  as  a  Respondent.  The 
elicitation  of  trustors’  opinions  about  the  others’  degree  of  trustworthiness  (in  addition  to 
information  on  their  degree  of  trust)  allows  us  to  deepen  our  understanding  about  the  motives 
underlying the “high” or “low” amount the trustors sent. Similarly, to elicit trustees’ attitudes to 
trust  (in  addition  to  information  on  their  degree  of  trustworthiness)  allows  us  to  deepen  our 
understanding about the motives underlying the “high” or “low” amount the trustees returned. As 
will be understood from the following, the attitudinal evidence about both trust and trustworthiness 
can  be  instrumental  in  separating  out  different  motivations  stemming  from  the  behavioural 
evidence.   
 
                                                 
6 All Instructions sheets are available at request from the corresponding author.   10 
Table 2: Model 2 Ordered Probit ‘Cox’ model of amounts sent and sent back 
 
Tokens sent - - - - 0.34 4.73 0.24 3.90
DG1 -0.18 -0.58 -0.23 -0.89 -0.51 -1.67 -0.10 -0.35
Female -0.57 -1.52 -0.37 -1.19 -0.33 -0.89 0.05 0.20
age -7.78 -3.45 -5.38 -2.83 -4.94 -1.97 -4.18 -2.06
Mid to high income family -0.46 -1.39 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.22 0.20 0.76
Economics student -1.46 -2.50 -0.73 -1.47 -1.11 -1.76 -0.59 -1.14
Mother has secondary or tertiary education -0.27 -0.81 -0.45 -1.66 -0.04 -0.12 -0.02 -0.06
Index of trust (v47) -0.44 -1.17 0.00 -0.01 -0.13 -0.44 0.05 0.20
Trust the family 0.89 1.74 - - -0.11 -0.26 - -
Trust people you know  0.57 1.26 - - 0.23 0.41 - -
Trust new aquaintances 1.09 2.22 - - 0.49 0.96 - -
Trust immigrants -0.63 -1.79 - - -0.43 -0.93 - -
Trust the government 0.40 0.97 - - -0.33 -0.76 - -
Trust Parliament 0.38 0.94 - - 0.85 1.79 - -
Trust Political Parties -0.54 -1.34 - - 0.50 0.66 - -
Trust Public Officials 0.24 0.74 - - -0.57 -1.24 - -
It is Justified to: (1=never; 10 = always)
Try to obtain State benefits ilicitly 0.10 0.33 - - 0.28 1.12 - -
Evade taxes -0.14 -0.41 - - 0.09 0.37 - -
Drive someone else's car without their permission 0.60 2.47 - - 0.19 0.78 - -
Tell lies in one's own interests 0.09 0.29 - - 0.44 1.32 - -
for someone to have an extra marital affair 0.10 0.49 - - 0.41 1.87 - -
Accept illegal payments (bribes) 0.13 0.52 - - -0.51 -1.98 - -
Use moonlighters - to avoid taxes 0.01 0.03 - - -0.33 -1.02 - -






Senders: Tokens sent Recipients: Tokens sentback




note: coefficients which are significant at .05<p<.10 are indicated in italics, coefficients which are significant at p<.05 
are indicated in bold. 
 
In Model 2 (see Table 2), the correlation between the general trust question (v47) and the amount 
sent and returned has a negative sign - for trusting participants there is even less tendency than in 
Model 1 to send or send back more than others. The effect of personal characteristics is in this case 
somewhat stronger than before although, for the most part, the results are consistent across the two 
experiments  –  women  and  older  people  tend  to  send  back  less  as  do  economics  students
7.  In 
general,  questions  dealing  with  the  subject’s  opinion  about  the  others’  civic  values  perform 
similarly to results in Model 1. 
When individuals are ranked according to the amounts sent and received back in each treatment, we 
are  in  the  position  to  disentangle  the  individuals’  disposition  towards  trust  and  reciprocity  by 
comparing  the  behaviour  determined  by  social  preferences  in  the  non-strategic  interaction  of 
treatments 2 and 3 with the strategic setting in which the two players are posited in the TG. The 
                                                 
7 The main exception here is age which for Senders in Model one had a positive and weakly statistically significant 
coefficient in Model 1.   11 
sender’s strategic behaviour in the TG results from the comparison of the amount sent by the trustor 
in the TG with the other-regarding preferences exhibited by the analogous player in the DG1 setting 
free  from  strategic  considerations  (figures  1  &  2).  Similarly,  a  measure  of  the  respondent’s 
reciprocating behaviour results from the comparison between the respondent’s strategic behaviour 
in the TG and the other-regarding preferences exhibited by the analogous player in the DG2 setting 
free from strategic considerations (figure 2).  
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The comparison of the results of the TG with the DG1 ones allows us to infer a measure of the 
sender’s possible trusting behaviour (figure 1). On average, the amount sent in the TG is greater 
than the amount sent in the DG1 (figure 2), and the amount sent back in the TG is lower than the 
amount sent in the DG2 (figure 3). In  the latter figure, the blue bars show the amount sent back in 
the TG and the red bars show the amount sent back in the DG2. In general, the subjects playing as 
first movers send amounts lower than in the experimental sessions performed by Cox (see Table 4). 
On the one hand, in contrast to Cox’s results the amount sent by the trustor is positive in almost all 
cases (the ratio of a positive amount sent is 31/33 vis-à-vis 26/32), and a zero amount sent is much 
less frequent than in the Cox experiment (we obtain a zero return two times in TG and five times in 
DG1 vis-à-vis 6 in TG and 11 in DG1 in the Cox sessions). On the other hand, compared  to the 
Cox sessions the frequencies of players in the TG are much higher at small as opposed to large 
amounts sent (the number of first movers who send less than 5 tokens is 23 vis-à-vis 4; the number 
of first movers who send all the 10 tokens is only 2 vis-à-vis 13).  As for the second movers, while a 
zero return occurs only 4 times vis-à-vis 9 times in Cox’s experiment, the trustee send back on 
average a lower amount than in the Cox sessions. Considering the low amount sent on average by 
the trustees, this result is probably also a consequence of a scant disposition to reciprocate. We will 
return to this argument below.   13 
Overall, by comparing the TG and the DG1 and the TG and the DG2, respectively, the inclination 
towards strategic reasoning stands out more clearly in our experiment than in Cox’s one. As for 
senders, in common with Cox we find that the amount sent in TG is in excess with respect to DG1, 
but on average with lower values than in his experiment (the mean amount sent in our experiment 
was $3.58 in the TG and $3.24 in the DG1, whereas it was $5.97 in TG and $3.63  in the Cox’s 
experiment).  As for respondents, the same result applies, as the average amount returned in our 
experiment was $1.50 and $1.64, compared to $4.94 and $2.06, respectively, in Cox’s one. 
These differences can be tested more rigorously. Following Cox (2004), we implement a test to 
statistically distinguish between the amounts sent in trust and dictator games. Formally, the general 
structure of the model estimated is: 
 
Ri = α+βDiSi+γSi+εi 
 
Where Ri is the amount sent back, Si the amount received by the recipient and Di is a dummy taking 
the  value  of  1  for  the  trust  game  participants.  The  coefficients  β  and  γ  provide  the  means  to 
distinguish between reciprocation and ‘other-regarding’ preferences. Since, as noted above, in the 
(modified) dictator game (DG2) there can be no reciprocating motive, the difference between the 
reaction of respondents to the amount sent in the two settings (D=0 and D=1) is a measure of pure 
reciprocity, specifically, the b coefficient. 
As to the specific technique employed for the estimation, as above, we prefer an ordered probit 
model to implement the test rather than the two-limit tobit model with heteroskedasticity correction 
used by Cox. It is true that the amounts to be sent back are bounded but this doesn’t seem to us to  
 
Table 3: Ordered probit model of ‘Cox’ type test of difference in amounts sentback in trust 





Coef. .      z Coef. .      z
----------- --------- ----------- ---------
Beta -0.01 -0.23 -0.04 -0.81




2nd experiment 1st & 2nd experiment
0.04 0.09  14 
be the significant issue in the econometrics here. The ordered probit model does not impose a priori 
that the marginal effects in the model are constant across amounts sent back. Moreover, as is well 
known, the implementation of a parametric heteroskedasticity correction term as in Cox (2004) is 
subject to the objection that the ‘correction’ is actually picking up a substantive effect (see, for 
example, Davidson & MacKinnon, 1986). Our results (reported in Table 4 below) show that there is 
no statistical distinction to be made between trust and dictator games in terms of the amounts sent 
back. In contrast to Cox’s results, the amount sent back is positive and statistically significant – for 
both trust and dictator games. However, the estimated effect of the amounts sent (γ) increases when 
observations from the earlier trust experiment are added. Once the strategic setting of the DG1 
treatment is considered along with the disposition to reciprocate in the absence of the sender’s 
behaviour of the DG2 treatment, the correlation between amount sent and amount sent back shows 
an impressive improvement. This is a hint that different motivations are at the origin of the different 
behavioural  choices  expressed  in  different  game  settings.  To  deepen  our  understanding  of  this 
question, the utilization of the statistical analysis of the information conveyed by the questionnaire, 
in the evaluation of the trustors’ and of the trustees’ behaviour, may provide further insight into 
what is actually going on. The following section takes this up, with the aim of identifying subjects’ 
underlying motives by matching their self-declared  attitudes with their behaviour. 
 
 
5. Using attitudinal measures to control for motivation  
In this section we put together behavioural and attitudinal measures in such a way as to put forward 
a coherent explanation for the results outlined above. By using the attitudinal questions, participants 
were identified as trusting or prudent on the one hand and trustworthy or untrustworthy on the 
other. Players with a value of the trust index (V47) above the median (=5 as it happens) were 
defined  as  trusting  and  others  prudent;  similarly,  a  composite  index  of  trustworthiness  was 
constructed from the answers to the relevant questions
8. Those with values above the median (=22) 
were defined as  untrustworthy, others (≤ 22) were defined as trustworthy. It is worth observing that 
there was no correlation in our sample (both overall and for each experiment separately) between 
trusting and trustworthy individuals as defined here. Table 4 reports the mean amounts sent and the 
mean  return  ratio  overall,  and  separately  for  the  two  sample  divisions  -  trusting/prudent  and 
trustworthy/untrustworthy.  
                                                 
8 Specifically, the index is the simple sum of responses to the questions of the form:  Is it (from never =1 to  always 
=10) justified to…e.g. evade taxes and so on. The resulting index covers the full possible range (from 8 to 80) with 
median =22. It might be more appropriate to think of this index more in terms of civic sense, rather than trustworthiness 
per se.   15 
In analysing the results we will test our hypothesis whereby the declared attitude towards trust 
reflects the self-perception about the participants’ own propensity to trust people and the declared 
attitude towards trustworthiness reflects the participants’ disposition to reciprocate as witnessed by 
their willingness to comply with civic values. 
Comparing trusting and prudent individuals, one may observe that in the trust (investment) game, 
trusting  individuals  in  the  role  of  first  movers,  send  much  more  (mean  =  4.4)  than  prudent 
individuals (mean = 2.9) as one might expect. When playing the dictator game, however, trusting 
and  prudent  first  movers  send  approximately  the  same  amounts  on  average.  Looking  at  the 
trustworthy/untrustworthy divide, amounts sent in the trust game is virtually the same for the two 
groups  of  individual  (3.50  for  the  trustworthy  group  and  3.63,  actually  a  little  more,  for  the 
untrustworthy group). In the dictator game there is a modest difference between the trustworthy 
(mean  tokens  sent  =  3.44)  and  the  untrustworthy  (mean  =  3.00).  What  is  striking  is  that  the 
“trustworthy” send less than the “trusting”. This result seems to confirm that the propensity to send 
depends more on the expected reciprocal behaviour by others which in turn is influenced by the 
trusting  nature  of  the  participants,  rather  than  on  some  sense  of  fairness  or  other-regarding 
preferences manifest in the civic nature of players. Another indirect proof of this behaviour is that 
trusting individuals and – to a lesser extent – trustworthy individuals “invest” in the interaction of 
the trust game more than in the DG1, where no strategic reasoning applies. Overall, considering the 
two groupings together, we may conclude that in a setting of strategic interaction such as the TG the 
personal  disposition  to  send  money  to  the  other  player  matters  more  than  altruism  and/or  the 
declared attitude towards civic values. 
As for respondents, the general presumption is confirmed that both the self-evaluation of one’s own 
disposition to trust and the evaluation about the appropriateness of compliance with civic values 
influence  reciprocating  behaviour.  Yet,  some  more  profound  insights  emerge,  as  strategic 
interaction  appears  to  draw  out  conditional  cooperation.  As  we  have  reported  above,  in  our 
experiment, similarly to the Cox one, the amount on average sent by all participants in the TG is in 
excess with respect to the DG1. However, comparing the amount returned in the TG and in the 
modified  dictator  game  (DG2),  the  first  distinction  (trusting/prudent)  presents  little  difference 
between the return ratio of the two groups, but trusting individuals return a smaller proportion of the 
amounts received in the TG than in the DG2 design. A plausible reason for this is the fact that the 
amount sent in the TG is on average much smaller with respect to the Cox experiment. Thus, we 
suggest that there is evidence of strong reciprocity, in the sense that the “trusting” feel betrayed by 
the first mover and react by returning a small amount. Data become even more telling by taking into 
account  also  the  second  divide  (trustworthy/untrustworthy).  The  mean  return  ratio,  which  for   16 
trusting and prudent were 1.61 and 1.45 (TG) and 1.76 and 1.55 (DG2) respectively, are nearly 70% 
higher  for  trustworthy  (1.84)  than  for  untrustworthy  individuals  (1.10)).  Similarly  to  the  above 
reported analysis with the two divisions (trusting/prudent and trustworthy/untrustworthy)  across 
Senders, the trusting and – to a much larger extent - the trustworthy send back in the trust game a 
larger amount than the prudent and the untrustworthy, respectively.  
 
Table 4: ‘Cox’ – type experiments, mean amounts sent and mean return ratio by attitudinal 
trust and trustworthiness 
     
Mean 
Tokens 
Sent  N 
Mean 
return 
Ratio  N 
All  TG  3.58  33  1.50  31 
   DG1  3.24  33  -  - 
   DG2  -  -  1.64  31 
Trusting  TG  4.40  15  1.61  11 
   DG1  3.08  12  -  - 
   DG2  -  -  1.76  14 
Prudent  TG  2.89  18  1.45  20 
   DG1  3.33  21  -  - 
   DG2  -  -  1.55  17 
Trustworthy  TG  3.50  14  1.84  17 
   DG1  3.44  18  -  - 
   DG2  -  -  1.55  18 
Untrustworthy  TG  3.63  19  1.10  14 
   DG1  3.00  15  -  - 
   DG2  -  -  1.78  13 
Note: The return ratio is defined as the amount returned divided by the amount sent by the first mover. This is very 
slightly different from Glaeser et al. (2000) where the denominator is the amount received from the first mover. The 
only difference is the multiple of 3. 
 
 
Figures 4 and 5 reinforce the evidence based on means. Figure 4 reports the relative frequency of 
players for the distribution of the amounts sent by trusting and prudent individuals in TG and DG1 
respectively;  figure  5  the  distribution  of  the  return  ratio  for  trustworthy  and  untrustworthy 
individuals in the TG and DG2 designs. The evidence for trusting and prudent individuals in the 
TG/DG1  comparison  is  very  different  from  the  evidence  for  trustworthy  and  untrustworthy 
individuals in the TG/DG2 comparison. In figure 4, there is no obvious pattern of difference in the 
tokens sent between the trusting in the TG and the DG1. However, from figure 5 one can see that 
the  relative  weight  of  TG  trustworthy  individuals  increases  as  the  return  ratio  becomes  larger.   17 
Indeed, at return ratios higher than 1.0 – 1.9, the relative frequency of the trustworthy in the TG is 
larger than the corresponding frequency of the trustworthy in the DG2.  
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Thus, the evidence considered here suggests two considerations. First, strategic behaviour drives 
behaviour more than altruism. In fact, for the “trustworthy” the reciprocity motive does actually 
play a more important role than the altruistic sentiment. Given that in the DG2 the amounts received 
by second movers were not decided by the potential beneficiaries of the dictators magnanimity, 
‘trustworthy’ individuals are rewarding the flesh and blood Sender, even though they don’t know 
precisely  who  that  is, more  generously  than  they  reward  an  unidentified  individual  who  is  not 
physically present – in which case they treat the amount received as manna. Similarly, but looking 
from  the  point  of  view  of  “negative  reciprocity”,  by  sending  back  a  smaller  amount  than  the 
“trustworthy” in the TG and a larger in the DG2, the “untrustworthy” seem inclined to punish a 
selfish sender. Overall, the behaviour of the trustworthy highlights reward, the positive side of 
reciprocity, while the behaviour of the trusting who feels betrayed and of the untrustworthy who 
stick to a sceptical view about his social environment both point to punishment, the dark side of 
reciprocity. 
Second,  the  trusting  and  the  trustworthy  both  send  more  in  the  TG  than  in  the  DG1,  but  the 
trustworthy return less than the trusting send, thus suggesting that in the TG strategic interaction the 
desire to “invest” is more important than compliance with civic values in motivating individuals. 
Hence, the motive for trusting and reciprocating behaviour do not necessarily overlap within the 
same individual. Recent experimental research (Fehr and Schimdt, 2001, 2005) indicates that trust 
and trustworthiness can hardly be disentangled, since individuals tend to reciprocate and to respond 
to the social behaviour they observe in real life contexts.
9 We agree with this statement, inasmuch it 
means that the level of trust manifested by each agent is moulded by his own life experience, and 
thus  also  by  the  degree  of  trustworthiness  of  individuals  belonging  to  his  social  environment. 
However, our results induce us to believe that a subject who self-reports and  behaves as a trusting 
individual will not necessarily exhibit a high degree of trustworthiness. To the same token but from 
the opposite perspective, subjects who report themselves as being “trustworthy” and put forward a 
reciprocating behaviour should not be expected to necessarily “invest” a large amount when playing 
the role of the trustor. The tentative implication of our results is that individual behaviour as far as 
trust and trustworthiness are concerned should be related to the “multiple self” view (Elster, 1986). 
Since in the personality of each individual many  components are  gathered together, in playing 
different roles in his various social interactions the individual is also differently motivated. The fact 
                                                 
9  In  the  words  of  Bacharach,  Guerra,  and  Zizzo  (2001),  “(o)nce  it  can  be  shown  that  it  is  reasonable  to  expect 
trustworthiness there is no longer any mystery about trust, since trust is typically a best reply to this expectation” 
(Ibidem, pp.1-2).   19 
that trust and trustworthiness may be interwoven within each agent does not imply that a subject’s 






6. Concluding remarks  
Our experimental design had two aims. First, to find out whether, and possibly to what extent, 
answers  to  a  questionnaire  about  attitudes  to  trusting  and  reciprocating  predict  the  subjects’ 
behaviour; second, by comparing behaviour in Trust and Dictator Game, to disentangle the strategic 
motivation (the intention of the trustor to elicit benevolence from the trustee, and the trustee’s 
interest in reciprocating to generous or not so generous invoice) from the altruistic motivation.  
An important outcome of our investigation is that no simple or direct correlation shows up between 
behavioural trust or trustworthiness and attitudinal trust or disposition to reciprocate, as resulting 
from the self-declared disposition to trust and comply with civic virtues. From the statistical and 
econometric treatment of behavioural evidence and answers to the questionnaire, we observe that 
the  link  between  the  questionnaire  and  experimental  sessions  is  more  subtle  that  the  mere 
correlation between average attitudes and average behaviours. In fact, the relevant evidence starts 
blossoming  after  that  the  two  main  motivations  for  trust  and  reciprocity  behaviour  –  strategic 
reasoning and altruism – have been separated out, by dividing subjects according to the varying 
degree witnessed by answers of disposition to trust and to be trustworthy.  
First,  the  self-declared  trusting  tend  to  “invest”  more  than  the  prudent,  and  the  self-declared 
trustworthy are more inclined to reciprocate than the untrustworthy. As for individuals playing as 
trustor, we have found a neat divide between subjects who self-report a positive disposition towards 
trusting (and then are willing to send a significant amount to the trustee) and those who instead are 
very reluctant to “invest” in the strategic relationship of the Trust Game (and thus send a small 
amount).  Similarly, as for individuals playing as trustee, they do not seem to be influenced much – 
on  average  -  by  the  amount  they  received,  but  in  case  of  a  small  amount  received  they  seem 
motivated by the desire to punish the sender, as they return much less than had received. The 
trustworthy are inclined towards strategic behaviour - both in the positive sense of rewarding the 
sender, and the negative one of punishing – more than “being nice to others”, as could have been 
manifested by a significant correlation between the amount returned in the DG2 and the amount 
returned  in  the  TG.  Overall,  we  find  that  strategic  interaction  is  more  important  than  social 
preferences in motivating subjects’ behaviour. The more trusting are the subjects, according to their   20 
answers to the questionnaire, the more they send as trustors, and the less they send back as trustee in 
case the senders deserves to be punished for having sent a small amount.  
Second, another important insight stemming from the analysis is that the disposition to trust, and the 
degree of compliance with civic values, appear to separately motivate people. In playing the Trust 
and  the  Dictator  Games,  our  subjects  performed  as  “multiple  selves”,  whose  heterogeneity  in 
behaviour seems to depend on the different motivations at stake in social interactions. No simple or 
direct  correlation  was  found  between  attitudinal  trust  and  trustworthiness  -  the  self-declared 
disposition to trust and to comply with civic values - and behavioural trust and trustworthiness in 
experiments,  respectively.  The  disposition  to  trust  and  the  disposition  to  reciprocate  separately 
motivates the subject when he opens the strategic  relationship playing as sender,  and when he 
reciprocates playing as respondent. The different weight of the motive entailed by the context - and 
not a wholly coherent behavioural inclination of the individual – seems to drive the action. 
Finally, on methodological  grounds, our investigation cast some doubts as to the possibility of 
establishing  a  direct  link  between  attitudinal  and  experimental  evidence,  as  far  as  trust  and 
trustworthiness are concerned. The answers to a questionnaire predict behaviour in experimental 
sessions only to a limited extent. The information conveyed by a survey appears to be much more 
powerful  after  the  two  motivational  components  have  been  separated  out  by  means  of  the 
comparison between the results of the Trust Game and each of the two Dictator Games respectively. 
Once the answers to the questionnaire have been employed for the statistical evaluation of the 
sessions,  our  interpretation  of  experimental  results  in  terms  of  the  two  alternative  motives  for 
behaviour - social preferences or strategic behaviour – has fairly improved. As for further research 
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Appendix: Trust & reciprocity questions 
 
  Range/values 
Individual Characteristics   
Age   
Sex   
Degree course  Economics (1
st-3









Mother & Father’s education  1= none 
2 = primary 
3 = lower secondary 
4 = upper secondary 
5 = tertiary 
Family economic situation  1 = well-off 
2 = above average 
3 = below average 
4 = low 
   
Trust/Reciprocity Questions:   
In general, would you say that you can trust most people or 
that one can never be too careful? 
1 = trust 
2= prudent 
(0 = don’t know) 
How much trust do you have in the following groups:   
- Your Family 
- People you know 
- New acquaintances 
- Immigrants 
1= no trust 
2 = trust a little 
3 = trust quite a lot 
4 = trust completely 
(0 = don’t know) 
Ethnic Diversity?  From 1 = lowers social 
harmony  
To 10 = is valuable  
Which of the following behaviours may be justified:   
- To try to obtain benefits form the State to which you are not 
entitled 
- To not pay your taxes 
- To take and drive someone else’s car without their 
permission 
- To make false statements to further ones own interests 
- To have an extra-marital affair 
- To accept a bribe 
- To pay for services ‘under the counter’ to avoid paying taxes 





From 1 = never justified 
To 10 = always justified 
(0 = don’t know) 
How much trust do you have in the following Institutions:   
- Government 
- Parliament 
- Political Parties 
- Civil Service/Servants 
1= no trust 
2 = trust a little 
3 = trust quite a lot 
4 = trust completely   23 
(0 = don’t know) 
Most people a) try to take advantage of you every time they 
can; or, b) try to behave correctly towards you  
From 1 = always try to 
take advantage  
To 10 = always try to 
behave correctly  
(0 = don’t know) 
 
 